Elery Hamilton-Smith Phillip Institute of Technology, Australia

Abstract: To relate tourism to leisure theory, this paper first offers a potential conceptual framework to assist in placing leisure in the context of other human behavior. This is done by considering dimensions of both subjective experience and structural environment. The field structured by these two dimensions is then reviewed by examining four more or less extreme positions, although emphasizing that reality will rarely conform to an extreme. The two dimensional field of human behavior is, like all conceptual models, an attempt to understand the immense complexity of reality. Turning to tourism, this framework demonstrates that just as recreation often fails to result in leisure, so the tourism industry may well detract from the positive aspects of the tourism experience, and at the worst, may produce alienation. Keywords: leisure, tourism satisfactions, rewards, alienation, authenticity, existential and structural dimensions. Hamilton-Smith teaches in the Department of Leisure Studies (Phillip Institute of Technology, Bundoora, Victoria 3083, Australia) but previously spent many years as a research and planning consultant working on a wide range of problems in many countries. ____________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION This paper develops a particular approach to integrating various forms of leisure theory, and then examines the potential of that approach for discovering a closer relationship between leisure theory and tourism. It commences with a brief outline of the author's approach to the integration of leisure theory before proceeding to any examination of tourism per se. Traditionally, the definition of leisure has been contested between various paradigms: many attempts at definition have proved unsatisfactory and it is indeed difficult to see any common agreement. Various authors such as Parker (1976), Neulinger (1981), and Kelly(1983) have provided useful overview listings of these attempts. However, simply listing various attempts is of limited value for the overall purpose of this volume of essays. Kelly provides a basis for the present approach by drawing attention to the fundamental importance of two specific dimensions: leisure-existential reality and leisure as social reality (Kelly 1983:4 - 6). He concludes (pp. 181 - 199) by drawing attention to the potential of dialectical analysis as a path to greater clarity. In effect, the approach here is an endeavor to use Kelly's dialectic as an integrating framework, with the provision that merely examining leisure within such a framework, is inadequate, since the field of analysis should be all human behavior. Within this field, leisure and other kinds of behavior might then be more adequately located and related to each other. The aim is not to replace existing typologies, but to establish a framework to assist a conceptual analysis of their relationship to each other and to social reality. Therefore, two dimensions of human behavior will be explored here. The first of these is the subjective reality (Kelly 1983), in the personal experiences and valuations of the individual. This is related to, but not identical with Neulinger's (1981) subjective dimension, and certainly not synonymous with Cohen's (1979) usage of the same term. The second is the environmental or structural reality (similar to the social reality of Kelly or objective reality of Neulinger) and is based in the opportunities and constraints imposed upon the individual from without. Both dimensions are, of course, continuous ones, altogether for heuristic reasons, the extreme positions are emphasized in this article. Space considerations permit a brief development of the framework and its two dimensions here. Obviously the two dimensions interact, and their separation is to at least some extent arbitrary, resorted to for purposes of analysis. Again, a full analysis of their interaction cannot be articulated here, but the overall framework is more fully developed in another paper currently in preparation. THE EXISTENTIAL DIMENSION One of the more useful examinations of the way in which people perceive their own leisure experience is that of Shaw (1985), who distinguishes 13 factors and relates them to the normal daily pattern of events. The present analysis selects only four factors which bring together some of those defined by Shaw, but which are also commonly regarded as part of any subjective definition of leisure. Here they are treated as major determinants of the existential dimension of human behavior. These are: 1. The presence or absence of telling that an experience is truly satisfying in itself - Neulinger's intrinsic motivation (1981:31). 2. The presence or absence of feeling free from external constraint. Many authors on leisure do not distinguish between "freedom from" and "freedom to," but this distinction is endemic to most discussions of freedom as such, and very useful to the current discussion. In phenomenological terms, this may well be seen as the sense of personal control over one's life (Witt, personal communication), or of doing "what I don't have to do" (Kelly 1983:15). 3. The presence or absence of feeling free to choose or to take action. Again the phenomenological perspective would probably lead to a sense of personal competence (Witt, personal communication) or of "being able to do. . . ." These two aspects of freedom are both closely interrelated to the individual's experience of the social environment. One who has the educational advantages and cultural self-confidence of the sheer levels of the social stratification system is much more likely to experience soundly-based feelings of freedom than an educationally disadvantaged and financially deprived person. This aspect will be further dealt with below. 4. The presence or absence of feeling personal involvement in, or of commitment to, action. Within Neulinger's formulation, this must be seen as a secondary effect of the factors already discussed, but it is clearly distinguished, in various ways, by other formulations that are important to the present argument. Thus, one finds Csikszentmihalyi (1975) discussing "flow," Ellis (1973) presenting the stimulus-arousal theory of play, Stebbins (1979) dissecting amateurism or "serious leisure," and Godbey (1985:9) talking of "internally compelling love." At the positive end of this dimension, one finds a high level of feelings of satisfaction, freedom, and involvement, and these feelings provide their own reward. Rewards, in other words, are in the feelings of the recipient. At the opposite extreme, one would discover an absence of these factors, probably leading to feelings of alienation, using that term in its subjective sense (Schweitzer 1982). Even though these factors are subjective ones, and essentially in the mind of the individual person, any one person's opportunity to achieve experiences at the highly positive end of this spectrum are certainly interrelated with their position in the social class system and hence their general life chances. This is the major point about which the interrelationship between the two dimensions is most clearly demonstrable, yet it is the point most often ignored or disputed. In spite of extensive empirical evidence, the so-called "compensation theory" of leisure dies hard. McKay (1986) provides both an illustrative analysis and an extensive international bibliography. When used to distinguish leisure, this dimension alone is inadequate, in that it does not satisfactorily distinguish between what is commonly known as leisure and much of what is recognized as work. Thus, in dealing with "flow experience," Csikszentmihalyi (1975) is clear that he is not describing leisure, and draws examples from both work and leisure settings. Later, he and his colleagues (Graef, Csikszentmihalyi and Giannino 1983) demonstrated that much of what takes place within work possesses the characteristics commonly assigned to leisure. Somewhat similarly, Stebbins (1979) makes it clear that amateurism, which is certainly located towards the positive end of this dimension, bridges between work and leisure, and shares characteristics of each. THE STRUCTURAL DIMENSION Turning to the structural dimension, a number of factors are discussed in the literature, although seldom in any overall sense. Parker (1976, 1983) provides one of the most useful analyses of the work-leisure nexus; Salaman (1974) develops the notion of linkages between leisure and occupational communities, an apparently promising direction of analysis which has not been adequately pursued since; Cheek and Burch (1976) develop a similarly promising direction in the idea of leisure locales; and Roberts (1978) attempts a more comprehensive review of structural factors, but only establishes one which seems to separate the structural determinants of leisure from the mainstream of structural analysis (Clarke and Critcher 1985: 40 - 44). Even these studies can be subjected, to varying degrees, to Rojek's (1985:1) critique as " . . . forms of theory which deal with the extensive critical literature on power, knowledge, signification, interdependency agency and the mode of production by ignoring it . . . in short, theories of `leisure without society'." This is not simply because they examine leisure (and work) in isolation from the totality of human society, but more importantly because society itself is assumed as given, rather than being also subjected to critical analysis. One other point which must be noted in opening this aspect of the discussion is that because the factors concerned are structural-environmental ones, they are external to the individual actor, and so not readily amenable to control by the individual. Further, as noted above, the individual and subjective position of the individual is also very strongly influenced by external forces, and so the individual may readily be seen as the victim of those external forces. Factors which might determine this dimension are numerous but a small number are adequate for present purposes. The first determinant is the extent to and manner in which society, and specifically, the individual's own cultural reference group, label specific sectors of the time-space continuum as "work" and others as "leisure." This may or may not coincide with the individual experience, but it does help to shape both behavior and the perception of and feelings about experience. The extent to which this dimension is based in the perspective of wider society places the detail of the label squarely within a stratification system of class, status and power. Some sectors carry high status because they contain such behavior as the practice of medicine, the writing of novels, or even being a University Professor, while others carry low status because they are to do with digging ditches, collecting garbage, or committing crime. This author recognizes the complexity and obscurity of the time-space concept, and while it cannot be fully developed here, prefers it to the naive simplism embodied in the term "free- time," or even "non-work time." A useful review of the concept can be found in Carlstein, Parkes and Thrift (1978). The second determinant of the structural dimension is the extent to which one is obligated by external forces to complete a task rather than continuing or not as the whim occurs. Thus, one who sets out to climb a mountain is expected to attain the summit and his/ her success is judged by this - unlike the individual who simply scrambles about on a series of boulders for fun or personal development of techniques. Obviously there is again an interrelationship between the two dimensions - the presence of external obligation is very likely to engender an internal sense of obligation. On turning to the normal pattern of work as involvement in the production process, the obligation to complete arises out of the extent to which labor or time possesses an economic value. The third determinant is the extent to which the rewards of one's behavior are based in structural characteristics rather than being absent or purely in personal satisfaction. This is similar to Neulinger's (1981) idea of extrinsic motivation. Thus, work, as employment, is rewarded by the payment of money and related economic benefits which in turn are inextricably related to social class, and hence to both lifestyle and life chances. Behavior and reward are inextricably caught in a mutually reinforcing relationship - those who already possess high status have a greater opportunity to behave in a way which will add to and confirm high status; those of low status will find it extremely difficult to do. Other forms of "work," whether artistic creativity, pursuit of an amateur interest, or the like, may or may not be financially profitable, but they do receive rewards in terms of enhanced status, power, or social class. Thus, within the present approach, one finds at the positive end of the spectrum, normal "work," defined as involvement in the production process, but also a great deal of what might commonly be seen as leisure, an which Stebbins (1979) has distinguished as "serious leisure." However, this dimension alone fails to adequately distinguish between behavior which is personally satisfying, expressive of freedom and personally involving on one hand, and sheer drudgery on the other. THE HUMAN ACTIVITY FIELD By considering both dimensions at the one time, a hypothetical framework can be established. One common way of presenting this would be to display the two dimensions at right angles to each other, thus establishing the familiar four-cell diagram. This all too easily results in perceiving human behavior as falling into four categories - an artifact which clearly distorts reality. This paper avoids such a presentation in order to emphasize that in reality any given segment of human behavior may fall anywhere within the total field. Essentially, it sets up four hypothetical "ideal types" in the Weberian sense, not as a description of actual behavior, but as a heuristic device against which actual behavior might be examined. In the following treatment, each of these four hypothetical types is identified in relation to the two major dimensions, and each is then used to examine specific aspects of human behavior. Each is later applied to tourist behavior specifically. Highly Positive on Both Dimensions This hypothetical position relates to behavior which is highly satisfying in personal and intrinsic terms, expressive of freedom, personally involving, is perceived by one's reference group as "work," demands completion or finitude, and is structurally rewarding. This is much like Nealinger's Leisure-Work (1981: 30-32). It includes "good work," in the sense of participation in the production process through a role which is personally fulfilling. It also covers "serious leisure" in the sense of undertaking an unpaid pursuit for its own sake, but at the same time sharing with professionals in the same pursuit a common series of criteria of success, or, in Stebbins' (1979) terms, participating in the same professional-amateur public system. Artistic creativity, whether paid or unpaid, is an illustrative example. It is usually, although not universally, seen by the participant as meeting all the criteria associated with personal satisfaction on the existential dimension; it is commonly termed one's "work" both by peers and public; and in particular, it demands completion or finitude. The world feels disappointed by an Edwin Drood or an Unfinished Symphony - the author or composer ought not to have died. Most importantly, this hypothetical position underlies the sector of human behavior where the actor receives both personal and structural rewards. The two dimensions are, of course, mutually reinforcing as one's personal satisfactions and are confirmed by meeting any demands for completion and by the structural rewards. Not surprisingly, it is most likely to occur among those who stand relatively high in the social stratification system, and that is compounded by the extent to which these same people are likely to experience this combination of rewards in all or most aspects of their lives. It is now possible to turn to tourism. The hypothetical tourist in this extreme of the field will have been of any external constraints in selecting his or her specific travel plan; will have felt able to undertake the program involved; will find it personally satisfying, be aiming to attain some goal or purpose, whose completion can be identified; will have been seen to be doing this; and will be rewarded with increased status or power as a result. It is extremely likely that he or she will identify himself/herself as a traveler, but will strongly resist acceptance of the label "tourist." The souvenirs of this kind of tourist are likely to again reflect the notion of authenticity. Particularly favored are "ethnic" arts and crafts, particularly if they were genuinely produced for local and not tourist consumption (Graburn 1984). As a convenient shorthand for later reference, one might call this kind of travel "tourism-as-quest." This is, of course, the end of tourism which MacCannell (1976) describes, but as Graburn (1983:18) has already pointed out, MacCannell is essentially talking about the middle classes "surrounding the world in search of new experience." Regrettably, his work is so often accepted as an apologia for the total tourism phenomenon, and so the reality of tourism-as-escape or tourism-as-consumption has been effectively obscured. Much of the present author's tourism over the last 10 years fits neatly into this ideal. He has freely chosen to visit many National Parks in each of two major subcontinents; has had the resources to be able to do this; has found it satisfying, even joyful; has become deeply involved in it; but has undertaken it as part of a long-run research study, recognized as an integral part of his "work"; and has achieved an enhanced status among at least some of his students and peers as an outcome. Obviously, the explorer-traveler is usually an example of this extreme position. Noyce (1958) reviews a remarkable wealth of material reporting the motives, circumstances, and satisfactions of explorers and adventurers, much of which illustrates the kind of characteristics already discussed. Mitchell (1983), in dealing with the mountaineering experience, not only gives excellent case material, but in his final chapter (pp. 222-225) argues that one can generalize to the experiential dimension of other less obviously adventurous activities. The tourism industry and tourism scholars have fully recognized the importance of this extreme with its cluster of potential rewards and satisfactions. Tours are packaged in terms of specific study programs, and often marketed through apparently "non-tourist" organizations and media such as the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, or the magazine of the New York Museum of Nature. The Sierra Club, of course, was its pioneer in the genesis of this type of tourism, commencing with its Tuolumne Meadows "outings" of 1901. Safari-type tourist experiences are packaged as giving the opportunity for "authentic" experience. Thus, tourism experiences are commoditized in these packages, which include not only fares, accommodation, meals, guide services, and the like, but as MacCannell (1976:23) points out, "their value is a function of the quality and quantity of experience they promise." Whether or not the promise is achieved is another question, depending not only on the quality of the package, but also on the matching between package and buyer. The commoditization of this kind of tourism by the industry leads to a wide range of experiences which try to conform to the ideal extreme - ranging from genuine exploration to some packages which are self-evidently of very questionable authenticity, yet find willing buyers. MacCannell (1976) provides a basis from which one can understand the dynamics of the commoditization process, and the way in which it exercises an appeal to the buyer. It is likely to lead in turn to the false belief that authenticity, surely a subjective factor, belongs only in tourism-as-quest. There is no question that tourism of this kind confers recognition and higher status from one's peers upon the tourist. The more one is seen to have sought out something different and truly authentic, the more one's tourism is seen as high-status behavior. As an example, the following conversation was overheard recently by the author: "It seems Nepal is the really fashionable place to go at present." "Not at all, that's pass‚. Ladakh is the place to go." "I don't even know where Ladakh is!" "Of course, that's why it's now the place to go." Highly Positive on Existential Dimension Only Here one can examine behavior which is highly satisfying in personal and intrinsic terms, expressive of freedom, and personally involving, but which is not seen as "work," does not or usually cannot demand completion of finitude, and does not provide any significant structural rewards. It is similar to Neulinger's Pure Leisure (1981:30 - 32). It includes a great deal of behavior undertaken "just for fun," amusements, relaxation, and diversion. There is often a sense that doing something different from one's everyday responsibilities is an important element here, and that part of the satisfaction may well lie in just that. There is no question that this is the alternative extreme which the tourism industry may and does offer. The normal sun-sea-sand-and-sex formula belongs here, as does any package which offers escape as opposed to quest. Cruise holidays, high class specialist hotels (or even better, castles) offering luxury accommodation and gourmet meals, many snow resorts casinos, and a range of other attractions all provide for such an opportunity. Again purely as shorthand, and by contrast with the previous extreme, one might label this "tourism-as-escape," even though there are clearly factors of attraction as well as factors of escape in choosing such an experience. The commoditization of this kind of experience also holds out a promise which may or may not be fulfilled. In this case, if the promise fails to eventuate, one probably finds the least pleasing (to the traveler) outcome - there are no structural rewards available and probably no plausible excuses for not enjoying oneself when one is meant to. This reflects the deeper ambiguity of an extreme which offers only the personal reward and withholds any possibility of structural rewards. An aspect which must not escape attention is the unknown extent to which this general area of tourism experience also embraces what might be called tourism-as- familiarity. It in turn relates to Shaw's (1985:9) effortlessness (mental). The extent to which people may find their personal freedom is constrained by the fear of new experiences leads to a wish to holiday in an unthreatening environment. Graburn (1983:20) cites work by Campbell which shows that "many of the affluent working classes in the USA do not have the cultural self-confidence to travel much out of their familiar surrounding, expressing their apprehensions about not knowing how to dress and eat properly, not knowing other languages, accommodation and transportation systems, and the fear of getting taken or the attractions of beggars. For them, the effort is not worth the pleasures." The general neglect of this kind of tourism by scholars is probably related to the concentration upon international travel rather than the domestic holidays which comprise the major part of tourism. A widespread example is the families who camp by the beach, in the same tent, or the same site, with the same neighbors, year after year. The author is aware of some families now using the same site into a third generation. This is a clear example of the influence of social class upon tourism opportunity. Yet this issue has been given very little attention. Obviously, to return to Rojek's (1985) criticism cited above, one not only has the study of "leisure without society," but also "tourism without society." Tourism-as-escape is often scorned by both those who prefer to identify, themselves as travelers, and the residents of the host society. It is seen as a mindless diversion, and as low status behavior. Such an attitude, of course ignores the reality and the importance of personal satisfaction, which may well be extremely high. To return briefly to the idea of authenticity, that individual may well see his tourism-as-escape as a truly authentic experience of exactly the nature he desires. However, as an illustrative example of this problem, a long experienced tourism professional recently confessed to the author that, following a period of extreme work stress, she had taken a packaged sun resort holiday. She found it intensely satisfying and appropriate to her personal preferences at that juncture, yet still felt a degree of embarrassment in discussing it. It is this kind of tourism which generates the greatest market for traditional souvenirs rather than the ethnic arts or other symbols of authenticity. Here it is important to buy items which explicitly signal where one has been. T-shirts are especially popular, particularly if the message on them subtly or blatantly suggests what a great escape holiday one has just enjoyed. In reality, as noted at the commencement of this discussion, few actual behaviors correspond to these hypothetical extremes. Most occupy intermediate positions. It is, therefore, of particular interest to note that many popular travel books are written around an experience which had some elements of "work," finitude, and structural reward, yet place a very strong emphasis on the existential. Some which exemplify this character include Chatwin (1977), Levi (1972), Matthiessen (1978), and Newby (1958). It seems reasonable to suggest that the great number of people who enjoy traveling vicariously by reading are not so interested in the accomplishment of an end purpose as they are in the experience and feelings of the traveler. Thus, as a direct comparison, Noyce's (1954) South Col proved to be much more highly regarded than Hunt's (1953) Ascent of Everest. Again, this adds some weight to the plea that the personal and existential as a basis for tourism should not be lightly disregarded, even when it leads to escape or fantasy. It is as valid for those who seek it as quest is for others. Highly Positive on Structural Dimension Only This extreme relates to behavior seen as "work" by one's reference group, which demands completion or finitude which is structurally rewarded, yet lacks personal and intrinsic satisfaction, fails to be expressive of freedom, and lacks any sense of personal involvement or commitment. It is very similar to Neulinger's Pure Job (1981:30-32) in that it provides only structural rewards through some kind of payoff. In general terms, it obviously includes paid work which is not satisfying to or enjoyed by the individual and is undertaken only for pay. However, it may well include other kinds of behavior. A sportsman who is highly skilled and becomes involved in higher levels of competition, then becomes bored with the game, but feels unable to " . . . let his team-mates down" will probably find his game to be drudgery. But he continues playing because of the rewards gained from external recognition by team-mates and fans and probably even from player fees. Similarly, many people find themselves trapped into having accepted some kind of responsibility towards their family, neighbors, peers, or an organization and then find this becomes drudgery, but continue, again because of the extrinsic rewards. There are probably two kinds of tourists to be considered here. First are those who must travel for some compelling extrinsic motivation, whether it be obligations to an employer, their own personal income-earning, or something else. But there are also those who have purchased a commoditized tour which has failed to deliver what they expected. But having purchased it, they feel themselves bound to the itinerary and persist, not gaining enjoyment or satisfaction, but determined to " . . . hang in there" and return home to relate the venture to envious friends. It is probably more important to an understanding of tourism as informed by this framework to recognize that there is at least some evidence that those who buy holidays for escape are very likely to come from an occupation which can only be assigned to the "pure job" category. They undertake work so that they can afford to live and to make the once-a-year escape. It would be, however, too simplistic to argue that this is a cause- effect relationship. The choice of an escape-type holiday is doubtless based in a wide range of factors arising out of one's personal background, including one's place in the social class system, which also, of course, largely determines one's employment opportunities. Highly Negative on Both Dimensions Here one finds behavior which is wholly alienating - with no sense of personal and intrinsic satisfaction, freedom, or involvement, no structure rewards, need to complete anything, or even the standing of being seen as "work." Not surprisingly, such behavior is not normally chosen by anybody. But it must be recognized that for many people, unemployment' results in exactly this. At perhaps an even more extreme position, the literature on behavior in prisons or other closed institutions demonstrates the extent to which people will struggle to develop goal-directed behaviors which offer personal and structural rewards, in order to avoid the dehumanizing effects of total alienation. As with the previous type, it is perhaps not a major consideration in tourism, and will only receive brief attention here. But regrettably, one occasionally finds tourists who can only be placed at this extreme. The most notorious are the "lost ones" or "drifters" of such regions as Southeast Asia. Young people who lose their social bearings may have linkage only with the illicit drugs subculture and drift aimlessly from place to place. But there are also people who buy a holiday package for which they are completely unequipped and for which nobody helps them to prepare. They lose their sense of direction or purpose, and become virtually paralyzed by fear and indecision. An illustrative example is the case of two young middle-class girls on their first trip out of their home country whom the author found huddled in the foyer of a hotel in New Delhi. Having ventured into the city on the first day, they had become frightened, and retreated to the hotel, where they had remained, weeping, eating packaged potato chips, and drinking Coca-Cola for five days, waiting only until their return flight. Then are also tourists who find themselves caught up willy-nilly in local violence civil or international war, and whose reaction, not surprisingly, is one of utter panic. DISCUSSION The two-dimensional field of human behavior described here is, like all conceptual models, an attempt to help understand the immense complexity of reality. Therefore, it is a simplification and must be recognized as such. But from a leisure theory perspective, it has value in helping to make sense of the complex nexus of leisure-recreation-work-job- unemployment, meet, and to understand the dual reward system which operates in respect to all of these. Recreation, for example, falls anywhere within the total field, depending upon the match between the participant and the experience. The model serves to demonstrate that although recreation services claim to be about " . . . meeting leisure needs," they may well produce outcome which cannot be properly described as leisure and may even be drudgery or alienation. This problem seems likely to arise as a result of packaging, and marketing a specific recreation experience (recreation as a consumer product). Similarly, and as demonstrated anecdotally above, tourism may be placed anywhere in the total field depending upon the person-situation being described. This model enables one to distinguish clearly between tourism-as-guest and tourism-as-escape. So far, it has been argued that these are both legitimate expressions, provided that they match the individual tourist and his/her situation. It has already been suggested above that tourists are likely to occupy the other extreme positions if the experience sold by the tourism industry does not match the buyer. Here one has an analogy with recreation: the negative outcomes, in at least some instances, result from a tourism-as-consumption philosophy, where the tourist experience is packaged along with the necessary supports of travel and accommodation and marketed in such a way as to maximize profitability or at least market-share. In this situation, it is very easy to see how the half-formulated preferences of the buyer are quickly subordinated to the ready availability of prepackaged opportunities. Therefore, one might raise questions about tourism education for potential customers, or about policies to increase customer power in the decision process, or about planning frameworks which might assist. It is then perhaps useful, as an example, to examine some of the ideas of recreation planners about how one matches participant to experience and minimizes conflict. One of the more promising planning tools is the Recreation Opportunity Spectrum of Clark and Stankey (1979) which provides for defining a range of outdoor recreation opportunities, clarifying the criteria which should be met in establishing each, and from this basis, ensuring that a wide spectrum of recreation behaviors is serviced. Perhaps the notion of a spectrum of tourist opportunities ranging between the two extremes of tourism-as-quest and tourism-as-escape is worthy of development. In effect, such a spectrum has already been put forward, in a very rudimentary form, by Smith ( 1977:9) in the introduction to her Hosts and Guests. A fully-developed planning tool based upon this beginning might both help planners to establish a more appropriate range of opportunities and help marketers to differentiate customers more effectively. Clearly; this bears a close relationship to the market segmentation approaches used in contemporary tourism planning. But the comparison with ideas developed in recreation planning may well add greater depth to thinking, just as the market segmentation of tourism planning may offer a great deal to recreation planners. One other example may serve to demonstrate the way in which this model might relate to another practical issue in tourism. There has been a considerable concern about the social and cultural impact of tourism. Indeed Smith's (1977) well-known book has a sufficient collection of case studies that the reality of the problem needs no further comment. One of the interesting conceptual approaches to this is offered by Butler (1980) in idea of a "tourist area cycle of evolution." In effect, his cycle is one in which tourism-as-quest gradually becomes more commoditized as the industry fights to offer novel opportunities for authenticity, until these have to be recycled as opportunities for tourism-as-escape, and ultimately discarded. The dynamic which drives the cycle is one of tourism-as-consumption, subject to the normal expansionist pressures of a market system. Probably this cycle can only be interrupted if the host government intervenes in the market system, as a small number have already done on a broad scale and virtually all have attempted in a peripheral and single-attraction mode. Turning to a more theoretical perspective, the dual-dimensional analysis of behavior offered here provides a more robust theory than many other approaches, in that it does place leisure fully back into its social context. Analysis of the various factors determining each dimension allows one to introduce and account for a wide range of social and political elements within the leisure (or tourism) experience, many of which have been excluded from traditional studies. Among the elements most often neglected in discussions of leisure are the closely- related ones of social class and occupation. In the same way, it is almost self-evident that there is an important interrelationship between occupation and holiday-taking, yet all too little tourism research has explored the relationship between tourism behavior and home behavior, of which class and occupation are central determinants. In conclusion, the parallels between this approach to leisure theory and its potential application to tourism studies are sufficiently close to facilitate a valuable transfer of learning between these two fields. Perhaps even more importantly, it provides a valuable tool for linking the study of leisure and tourism to the mainstream of social theory. Acknowledgments - The model presented here has arisen out of numerous discussions with colleagues and students, all of whom deserve a share of the credit and none of the blame. In particular, I am grateful to Theo Bodewes, Phillip Bosserman, Jack Kelly, Peter Witt, Geoff Godbey, Rob Lynch, Roger Trowbridge, Tony Dalton, and Gregory Heath for their stimulation and clarification of my thinking. But in naming them, I must also emphasize that perhaps the greatest inspiration comes from the critique (both spoken and unspoken) of my students. Finally the comments of referees aided greatly in clarifying some further aspects. REFERENCES Butler, R. W. 1980 The Concept of a Tourist Area Cycle of Evolution: Implications for Management of Resources. The Canadian Geographer 24(1):5 - 12. Carlstein, T., D. 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