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Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (1976). |
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Premerger notification process. |
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Post-merger HHI below 1,000. |
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Unconcentrated. |
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Respond with Sherman 1 if explicit collusion. |
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No challenge to mergers in this region. |
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Post-merger HHI between 1,000 and 1,800. |
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Gray area. |
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Agencies unlikely to challenge a merger
increasing HHI by less than 100 points, but likely to challenge otherwise
unless agencies think the merger won't lessen competition. |
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Post-merger HHI above 1,800. |
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Highly concentrated. |
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Challenge if change in HHI > 50, unless
agencies think merger won't lessen competition. |
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Du Pont patents moisture proof cellophane in 1927. |
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Du Pont has 75% of cellophane market, but only
20% of the market for “flexible packaging.” |
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Court: cross-elasticity of demand between
products. |
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But be careful: substitutes at competitive price
not monopoly price. |
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U. S. v. Alcoa (Rome) 377 U. S. 271 (1964). |
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Alcoa buys another maker of aluminum cable. |
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Court says aluminum a separate market from
copper. |
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U. S. v. Continental Can Co. 378 U. S. 441
(1964). |
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Continental acquired a maker of glass jars. |
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Court ignores cross-elasticity and defines
market as metal and glass containers.
What about paper, plastic, etc.? |
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Gerrymandering markets. |
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Geographic market. |
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Same concept and approach. |
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The baseline problem. |
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Need to start test from the competitive price,
not (necessarily) the observed market price. |
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