Chapter 3:
The Paradigm of Lot 49
In light of the critical perspective offered by the literary-instrumental
language continuum, a reading of an exemplary text will aid in grounding the
concepts presented in the previous chapters. The Crying of Lot 49 is ideal for this study,
not only because it is a complex, highly polysemic text, but because the principal
subject matter of the book is
language and communication, especially as concerns metaphor, pun, and ambiguity.
Judith Chambers includes Lot 49 among
Pynchon's works in which he "experiments with style and language, using
allegory, pun, parable, and parody to call attention to the transfiguration
of language and to reinfuse it with mystery" (4). She then adds, "But
each [work] also talks about
loss and decline, talks about
indeterminacy and paradox." In this sense, the novel may be read as a
conversation about itself, a dialogue that encourages the deconstruction of
the text. Thomas Schaub observes that this self-reflexivity also characterizes
Melville's Moby-Dick; for example,
the opening chapter of that novel, "Etymology," both talks about
meaning and is itself a carrier of meaning. Lot
49 is more valuable to the present study only because it directly
addresses contemporary communications issues, including the rudiments of information
theory, both of which are central to the discussion of literary and instrumental
language.
Lot 49 is
further appropriate to a realization of the theoretical propositions of the
previous chapter because the novel's protagonist, Oedipa Maas, is herself
a type of reader. Expressing a view common to a majority of Lot 49 critics, Maureen Quilligan suggests
that of all Pynchon's characters, Oedipa "is the protagonist who is presented
most consistently as a reader" (200).[1] This has the
effect of fusing the reader's experiences with Oedipa's; as she attempts to
read the text of her world (as well as a particular text in her world, The Courier's Tragedy) the reader is encountering the same
text, and both Oedipa and the reader are simultaneously engaged in interpreting
it. Moby-Dick again makes for
an interesting parallel: Ishmael is very much a reader throughout the novel;
one need only again recall his meditations on "whiteness." Ahab
too is a reader, and his text is the eponymous whale itself. As a result,
Schaub concludes, "Both books are about reading texts and the systems
of understanding which characters read out of their central symbols"
(118). Though specifically addressing Lot
49, Hanjo Berressem makes an observation that is also appropriate
to both novels: "Rather than just show the dissemination of the (inter)text,
Pynchon stages the confrontation of the mortal subject with the immortal,
atemporal, and disseminating text" (88). In other words, both texts depict
central characters wrestling with polysemic texts or symbols (the whale, Tristero)
that are inhuman and infinitely powerful in their capacity for evading totalizing
readings. In the case of Lot 49,
the reader observes the encounter between Oedipa and her disseminating text(s)
while undergoing the same experience with the text of Lot 49 itself.
These two qualities, the novel's explicit concern with language
and communication and its readerly protagonist, make Lot 49 particularly suitable for a reading
in conjunction with the study of literary and instrumental language. While
the nature of complex texts makes them incompatible with totalizing readings,
it is not too much to project a rough interpretive framework that highlights
key connections between this study and the novel. Oedipa, in these terms,
begins the novel as an instrumental reader of her world; she is soon "sensitized"
to the polysemic messages all around her. She then quickly finds herself nearly
paralyzed by an agglomeration of meanings, and begins to doubt whether all
of them can be "real." By the end of the novel she is hyper-aware
of communications systems and polysemies, but uncertain as to whether they
have led her to an otherwise concealed community of the alienated, or into
a state of "ontological" paranoia, as Berressem describes it (109).
For the purposes of this exploration of the novel, and to
better parallel the reader's experience with Oedipa's, the hypothetical reader
posited in the following discussion is an inexperienced one. That is, this
reader is accustomed to texts that are principally instrumental in nature,
and has not had any experience with complex literature or Lot 49 specifically. This is not, of course,
to say that a knowledgeable reader with some background in the novel will
fail to share in the same key experiences, but that with such a reader they
will be less manifest. To fully mimic the progression of Oedipa's quest, one
must share her initial assumptions about language and reality.
At the novel's opening, both Oedipa and the reader expect
their texts (her world, the reader's copy of Lot
49) to be faithful to "reality," which in this case involves
the direct and singular correspondence between messages and meanings. In Oedipa's
case, this assumption is established less by the actual opening pages of the
novel than by the resulting change in Oedipa over several chapters; this is
perfectly reasonable, however, because if Pynchon had gone out of his way
to establish Oedipa's instrumental perspective he would arguably have overcued
the reader as to Oedipa's limited perceptions. He places Oedipa in a stereotypical
middle-class milieu, suggesting that her world is prefabricated by the prevailing
consumer-cultural powers; the opening sentence of the novel begins "One
summer afternoon Mrs [sic] Oedipa Maas came home from a Tupperware party whose
hostess had put perhaps too much kirsch in the fondue . . ." (9). The
now-classic Tupperware party is evidence of the vapid and form-driven nature
of Oedipa's social reality. The Oedipa of later chapters would have wondered
why there was too much kirsch
in the fondue, and exactly who put it there.
There is, perhaps, better evidence of Oedipa's initial monosemic
(or possibly asemic) vision in her understanding of Mucho Maas, her husband.
A critically overlooked figure, he is in fact very similar to Oedipa; the
significant difference is that his character progresses inversely to hers
over the course of the novel. While Oedipa opens the novel unaware of the
omnipresence of signs and meanings, Mucho is only too aware of the meaning-laden
world around him. He suffers terribly from memories of working as a used car
salesman, during which time he had become "so hyperaware of what that
profession had come to mean that working hours were exquisite torture to him"
(12-13). Now he can no longer look at sawdust, pencil shavings, or any viscous
fluids because they all remind him of the tricks used by his former colleagues
to make sick cars sound well. His symbolic network extends beyond the singular
meanings normally ascribed to sawdust and honey. Mucho is also a reader, and
his text is the lot and the cars that come and go. His interpretation of the
trade-ins offered by his clients is both brilliant and terrible: the poor
and broken form "a parade seven days a week, bringing the most godawful
extensions of themselves, of their families and what their whole lives must
be like . . ." (13). Further, he cannot "accept the way each owner,
each shadow, filed in only to exchange a dented, malfunctioning version of
himself for another, just as futureless, automotive projection of somebody
else's life. . . . To Mucho it was horrible. Endless, convoluted incest"
(14). He reads the cars and his customers as communicating multiple meanings
ranging well beyond the conventional; each becomes a metaphor for the other.
As if this were not evidence enough of his polysemic awareness, at the end
of the novel the origin of the nightmares that have since plagued him is revealed:
a "creaking metal sign" that hung at the lot, reading "N.A.D.A."
(144). The letters are an acronym, identifying the lot as having membership
in the National Automobile Dealers Association, but Mucho reads another meaning
out of the sign (which is both literally and figuratively a "sign");
taking the sequence as a Spanish word, he arrives at a second possibility:
"nothing."[2]
Thus the bleak horror of the sign saying "nada, nada, against the blue
sky" as it swings.[3]
Oedipa, in contrast, doesn't understand the nature of Mucho's
suffering; nor does she appear to want to. Rather callously, she begins to
think that it might have been better for Mucho to have served in a war, with
"Japs in trees, Krauts in Tiger tanks, gooks with trumpets in the night,"
any of which he might have forgotten sooner than his experiences at the lot
(15). The novel's opening scene further emphasizes Oedipa's failure; when
Mucho comes home from work and begins unloading his troubles, Oedipa tells
him, "You're too sensitive" (12). This is highly ironic, considering
that later in the novel Oedipa will try to fulfill the role of a "sensitive,"
for the purpose of making a machine operate. Their role reversal is complete
at the novel's end. Oedipa is initially immersed in a particular social reality,
and is arguably undifferentiated from the other women in attendance at the
Tupperware party; Berressem similarly concludes that at the beginning, Oedipa
is "completely submerged within culture, a culture that is in turn completely
submerged within itself" (94). She later comes to be extremely ego-centered,
ready to "project a world" of which she herself is the center.[4] Mucho, on the
other hand, begins as a very distinct individual with a multi-layered awareness
of the world around him; it is only at the end of the novel, after he has
begun taking LSD under the guidance of Dr. Hilarius, that his ego dissolves
and his awareness shifts from a plurality of meanings to a unified, panpsychic
meaning. As Mucho's boss explains
to Oedipa, "Day by day, Wendell is less himself and more generic. He
enters a staff meeting and the room is suddenly full of people, you know?
He's a walking assembly of man" (140). To Mucho's advantage, the "nada"
nightmare no longer plagues him, but it is ultimately at the expense of his
selfhood.
Although the text does not detail Mucho's progression from
creative interpreter to passive consumer, Oedipa's increasing perceptions
of polysemy and unusual communications media are in large part the substance
of the book. Critics have generally identified one particular event as being
key to Oedipa's "sensitization," the moment she understands that
the world she knows is not the unified whole she takes it to be. This incident
occurs early in chapter three, immediately following her tryst with Metzger,
the co-executor of Pierce Inverarity's will. Oedipa has received a letter
from Mucho, one that she suspects will be empty of meaning; this "intuition"
prompts her to look more closely at the exterior of the envelope, which leads
her to read the cancellation blurb on it, "Report All Obscene Mail To Your Potsmaster"
(46). The seeming error "potsmaster" catches her attention, and
tips her off to look for further subtle incongruities. According to Thomas
Schaub, "This [event] is the beginning of her discovery of an alternative
message service; once she acquires the McLuhanesque knack, she is quick to
read the messages encoded in the medium of America, congruent with the ostensible
signs it proffers" (25). Berressem goes further, suggesting that this
is the "first break" detected by Oedipa, "shifting her attention
from the signified to the signifier" (95). He explains:
The error is based on the smallest form of linguistic
disorder, the
displacement of two phonemes, yet this minimal
mistake is the first instance
in which the tissue of the complex and vast
discursive network that makes
up Oedipa's reality begins to give way. (95-96)
Perhaps. The text of Lot
49, however, is less specific, identifying instead a locus of events
that heighten Oedipa's awareness of communicative fissures and polysemies.
As the narrator or Oedipa rather abstractly identifies it, she was "set
up or sensitized, first by her peculiar seduction, then by the other, almost
offhand things" (45).[5] In the next paragraph it seems more certain,
as the former possibilities are apparently dismissed: "It got seriously
under way, this sensitizing, either with the letter from Mucho or the evening
she and Metzger drifted into a strange bar known as The Scope." This
indeterminacy is characteristic of the novel, and just as Oedipa reflects
on her own sensitization and its ambiguous status, the reader simultaneously
contends with this uncertainty without being given any privileged information
by the text as to which is the "real" sensitizing event. It is clear
that Oedipa's visit to The Scope, where she meets Mike Fallopian and discovers
the W.A.S.T.E. system, does have at least one discernible revelation; following
her conversation with Fallopian, the text reads: "So began, for Oedipa,
the languid, sinister blooming of The Tristero" (54).
There is another significant visionary episode much earlier
in the novel, at the very beginning of chapter two. Driving into San Narciso
in a rented Impala, Oedipa is struck by the "ordered swirl of houses
and streets" she sees from atop a slope; the sensory impression recalls
her experience changing a transistor radio's battery, exposing her to the
micropatterns of a circuit board for the first time (24). This moment has
a peculiar effect on her:
Though she knew even less about radios than
about Southern Californians,
there were to both outward patterns a hieroglyphic
sense of concealed
meaning, of an intent to communicate. There'd
seemed no limit to what the
printed circuit could have told her (if she
had tried to find out); so in her
first minute of San Narciso, a revelation also
trembled just past the
threshold of her understanding. (24)
It is appropriate that "in her first minute" she
experiences the intimations of a revelation, because San Narciso is the heart
of Inverarity's estate and the site of the remainder of Oedipa's "sensitizations."
The character of this first oracle is announced as being of a rather high
order, for "she and the Chevy seemed parked at the centre of an odd,
religious instant." Given this textual evidence, it is arguable that
this incident marks the first step in Oedipa's induction into the polysemic
beyond.
Regardless of exactly when Oedipa's communicative consciousness
is first awakened, the reader's own raised awareness is likely to follow shortly
thereafter. The ambiguity of the "revelation," as well as the text's
own undercutting of the "religious instant" (the phrase is used
first as plain text; it then appears on the next page in quotation marks,
suggesting its dubiety) will suggest to the reader the instability of the
"reality" projected by the text. Indeed, the reader may already
be questioning the text's reading of the Remedios Varo painting and its connection
to Oedipa, which appears just at the close of the first chapter. The painting,
"Bordando el Manto Terrestre," shows several girls embroidering
a tapestry inside a tower, but the tapestry composes the contents of the world;
as Schaub observes, it is an "inverse parable of creation" (33).
Oedipa's conclusion calls attention to the artifice of personal narrative,
as well as to the textuality of reality: "She had looked down at her
feet and known, then, because of a painting, that what she stood on had only
been woven together a couple thousand miles away in her own tower, was only
by accident known as Mexico . . ." (21). She is thus made aware of the
potentially solipsistic nature of perceived reality, which by extension suggests
to the reader that the world of the text may be a representation of Oedipa's
own tapestry. Of course, some readers (certainly those with some literary
background) are likely to be "sensitized" on the first page, upon
encountering a character named "Oedipa."[6]
Similarly, Schaub suggests that the call letters of Mucho's radio station,
"KCUF," are key to inducing in the reader the kind of "inquisitive
alertness" later possessed by Oedipa. In his reading,
The call letters present the reader with a set
of questions which parallel
those facing Oedipa: are these letters arbitrary
or purposeful? have they a
literal meaning directly linked to specific
plot and character, or are they
relevant only within the complex of meaning
of the book? (113)
Or, one might wonder whether
the arrangement is a joke, intended to push the reader out of the world of
the text and force a confrontation with the text as text; for if Oedipa and Mucho do not recognize the encoded
message, and it is not then a part of their world, it is a message intended
only for the reader, and is in a sense only part of the text of the novel.
This split reference establishes a tripartite tension: between the reader
and the text, between the reader and Oedipa's world (as projected by the text),
and between Oedipa's reading of her world and its actuality. In short, the
reader must attempt to discern the particular destination(s) for each meaning
elicited from the text; some exist only for the reader, some for the world
of the novel, and some for Oedipa alone.
This initial sensitization, whenever it occurs, leads both
Oedipa and the reader to pay more attention to potential communication systems
and messages, which in turn reward this attention and heighten sensitivity.
Following her encounter with Mike Fallopian and subsequent discovery of the
W.A.S.T.E. postal system, Oedipa is led by the Paranoids to a Jacobean revenge
play which she believes has some parallels to one of Pierce's concerns. It
is in this play, The Courier's Tragedy,
that Oedipa first encounters the word "Tristero," and in this context
it is associated both with messengered communications and the transformation
of human bones into ink; the latter Oedipa connects to Pierce's own investment
in human bones for the lake at Fangoso Lagoons, as well as for the manufacture
of cigarette filters. The increasing number of connnections that fail to lead
to anything but more questions only draws Oedipa further in. She follows up
with Fallopian and pursues the text of the play some, but these leads become
only part of her newfound sensibility: ". . . these follow-ups were no
more disquieting than other revelations which now seemed to come crowding
in exponentially, as if the more she collected the more would come to her,
until everything she saw, smelled, dreamed, remembered, would somehow come
to be woven into The Tristero" (81). Oedipa is on the borderline, if
not over it, of a perceptual phase transition; she is, at this point, so sensitized
to the potential density of meaning underlying the text of her world that
everything has revelatory possibilities.
Indeed, she eventually comes to the point that she avoids acquiring new information,
for fear that her revelation may "grow larger than she and assume her
to itself" (166). As Seed notes, this progression is an important part
of the structure of the novel: "The more connections Oedipa makes, the
more information she receives, hence further connections have to be made, and
so on. Pynchon keeps the novel moving at a fast pace so that it becomes proportionally
more difficult for Oedipa to organize the information she receives" (119).
The reader is likely to suffer the same uncertainty with
Oedipa, as the text of Lot 49
does not provide the answers Oedipa so desperately craves; it too burgeons
with meanings and possibilities, and is equally short on resolutions. J. Kerry
Grant similarly argues that "The reader is inexorably caught up in Oedipa's
predicament precisely because the experience of reading the novel so closely
resembles her efforts to disentangle Pierce's legacy" (xvi).[7]
Just as with Oedipa, the proliferation of polysemies and the connections made
among them lead to a perceptual phase transition in the reader; furthermore,
the meanings seemingly specifically coded for the reader, such as "KCUF"
or the names "Stanley Koteks" and "Mike Fallopian," offer
the reader even more possibilities, ones unavailable to Oedipa; in this latter
case, the reader is forced to wonder what (if any) meaning to draw from the
apparent connection between two names that have associations with female sexuality.[8] There are also
the borderline cases, as with the group named "The Paranoids," whose
ostensible meaning(s) may be available to both Oedipa and the reader, and
whose meanings may be different for each.
The reader suffers a further challenge: differentiating
"fact" from "fiction." Much of Lot 49 is composed of historical accounts of one sort or another,
and they are generally presented rationally and thus believably. Even a moderately
educated reader is likely to note that a number of these accounts appear valid,
or are at least not immediately dismissible. Intertwined with these histories,
however, are elements that are apparently unique to the novel, that are "fictional."
As Seed observes of the Peter Pinguid history provided by Mike Fallopian,
"the story combines plausibility with blatant fiction (the name of Pinguid,
for instance) in a way which involves the reader in Oedipa's desire to verify,
and the sequence of stories and information which she receives is carefully
calculated to keep her and the reader guessing" (124). What makes this
more disturbing for the reader is the fact that, while Oedipa's difficulties
are at length removed from "the real world," contained within a
fictional text, the reader has no such buffer. Schaub notes that these commingled
histories effectively bind the reader's world to the text's. He uses the Maxwell's
Demon metaphor to describe the reader's role:
The reader is the Demon inside Pynchon's world,
sorting and "unpacking"
the facts. As their overt presence within the
fiction is shown to correspond
to a covert presence in our world, the reader
is engaged, like Oedipa, in a
transvaluation of the given understandings of
his world. (116)
Not only, then, does the
reader face the challenge of accounting for and totalizing a plurality of
polysemies, he is also encouraged to identify those "facts" unique
to Oedipa's world, the world of the text, and those shared by his own world.
This suspension of certainty leads to an evaluation of all
information and a faith in potential meanings, no matter how improbable. The
result of this phase transition is, in part, a generation of spurious meanings
and connections, ones not intended by the author (or in Oedipa's case, not
"real" in her world). While it is impossible to guess at the meanings
produced by the average reader, there is a bounty of evidence provided by
critics (unintentionally) as to the ease with which nearly absurd readings
may be arrived at. For example, Robert Murray Davis identifies the name "Nefastis"
as an anagram of "isn't safe" (368). Judith Chambers traces a winding
path through Oedipa's last name; she looks "Maas" up in the Oxford
English Dictionary (and notes that Oedipa is called Oed in the
novel, thus O.E.D., another connection) and concludes
that "A proper noun, it refers to 'Meuse,' a French river - an inconsequential
fact. Pronounced 'my ooze,' however, Meuse is very likely a homonym for 'muse'
and is, in fact, just one letter away from that word" (101). Schaub,
normally a reliable commentator, has a unique reading of Pierce's first name;
he asserts that it "derives from 'petrus' or rock," and goes on
to explain that "As founder of San Narciso, Pierce is an inverse Peter,
on whom is built the profane church of America" (33). He needed only
go a step further and note the traditional Christian typology connecting Peter
and Christ, and then assert that Pierce is the Antichrist. For sheer numbers,
it is worth noting that in his Companion
to The Crying of Lot 49, J. Kerry Grant lists approximately ten
different interpretations of the name "Pierce Inverarity," and this
is by no means exhaustive.[9]
This is not to say that these readings are "wrong."
On the contrary, they are in fact fascinating because they straddle the line of plausibility,
and the connections they make are simultaneously intriguing and unbelievable.
What is objectionable is the claim to truth implicit in these interpretations;
they are offered as definitive explications of authorial intention. The jouissance
of a polysemic text is precisely the play of meaning it affords, and the validity
of a meaning is determined solely by the connections that can be made. The
belief that one has found the
meaning runs counter to the nature of the text.
Such a multiplicity of meanings, however probable one finds
them, also demands that one admit the improbability that all of them are intended, and if one is in
search of the "truth" this presents an obstacle; Oedipa and the
reader must confront the possibility that some of the meanings in their texts
are of their own manufacture. For the reader in pursuit of totality and the
discovery of an authorial/authorized structure, this is a disconcerting fact
to acknowledge. For Oedipa, it is terrifying, because her text is her world,
and if her understanding of it is unpredictably altered by her perception
of it, she cannot function. She is trapped in a self-imposed binary that resolves
into two equally despairing possibilities: she is crazy, or the Tristero and
all of the meanings and signs she has encountered
are real. She does, on occasion, recognize that some of her perceptions may
be flawed; this happens twice during the "nighttown" scene, when
the city seems pulsing with signs. The first concession occurs following a
bus ride, during which she falls asleep off and on and dreams of the post
horn; the narrator suggests that "Later, possibly, she would have trouble
sorting the night into real and dreamed" (117). A similar line appears
shortly thereafter: "She grew so to expect it [the post horn] that perhaps
she did not see it quite as often as she later was to remember seeing it"
(123-24).[10] Yet these
ambiguities do not lead Oedipa out of the binary; she remains in thrall to
its two exclusive possibilities. For the reader, these two statements reinforce
the potential unreliability of Oedipa's perceptions as well as suggest that
the reader's own understanding of the text is infected by this unresolved
ambiguity.
Oedipa's insistence on tracking down the "truth"
about the Tristero mystery puts her in a role similar to that of her namesake,
Oedipus. The novel is, in a sense, a quest for identity on multiple levels,
and Oedipa plays at being a detective throughout. Berressem suggests that
Oedipa's ultimately failed attempt to resolve known facts out of perceptions
makes Lot 49 a "deconstruction"
of the mystery novel genre. The text certainly provides a great deal of evidence
on this score; Oedipa herself claims kinship to the stereotypical "private
eye." Suffocating under the profusion of post horns in "nighttown,"
she compares her present "fatalism" with her former self:
That optimistic baby had come on so like the
private eye in any long-ago
radio drama, believing all you needed was grit,
resourcefulness, exemption
from hidebound cops' rules, to solve any great
mystery. (124)
As if taking her cue from
these radio dramas or cheap paperbacks, Oedipa believes that a mystery, of
necessity, has a structure and form into which all clues ultimately resolve;
further, that human perception has nothing to do with "reality,"
which can always be reconstructed according to the temporality of cause and
effect via the evidence left behind. By
using the classical model, Oedipa fails to allow for ambiguities and polysemies
that are not connected to the mystery; she also does not understand that some
mysteries (especially those of the real world) are unsolvable. Molly Hite
makes an interesting observation on the nature of the traditional novel and
its connection to Oedipa's type of approach:
One of Pynchon's central insights is that people
tend to 'read' experience
the same way that they read books. A novel is
traditionally a totalizing
structure that derives much of its energy from
its promise to reveal the
intrinsic connections uniting apparently contingent
elements. . . . A
conventional narrative is a process of putting
things together, and the
satisfaction of closure involves the sense that
everything has been wrapped
up. (17-18)
Oedipa, then, is a reader
struggling with an atotal, polysemic text, who refuses to give up the dream
of totality.[11] To this end, Hite notes that the Tristero
becomes Oedipa's "totalizing principle" (16). The only problem is
that Oedipa is totally uncertain as to the true nature of the Tristero; indeed,
she remains uncertain until the end as to whether or not it exists. As a totalizing
principle, then, it solves no mystery, only encapsulates one.
Oedipa's detective-like approach to her "revelations"
is emphasized by the language of the text (which may also be the language
of her thoughts); at the opening of chapter three, just when things have begun
"turning curious," the word "logically" is repeated three
times in two sentences. The last of these is telling: "That's what would
come to haunt her most, perhaps: the way it fitted, logically, together" (emphasis added 44). Logic, then, is a criterion for truth.
Later, as Oedipa comes to terms with the binary that threatens to destroy
her, she takes inventory of what she "knows" about the Tristero
(109). In fact, she believes that only her ignorance stands in her way, and
if she knew enough, the mystery could be solved (82). Logic and knowledge:
the tools of Sherlock Holmes. The danger is that the reader is tempted to
be caught up with Oedipa, imitating her methods, affirming her conclusions;
doing so, however, only results in facing the same unresolved binary that
she does.
There is one aspect of Oedipus' legendary quest that looms
threateningly over Oedipa's: the solution to his mystery resulted in tragedy,
as he discovered that the murderer he sought was in fact himself. As Eric
Charles White points out, "Recapitulating the career of her namesake,
Oedipa Maas may herself be the criminal she seeks" (270). One does not
need recourse to the allusion, however, to make such a case. By executing
Pierce's will, carrying out her self-appointed duty "to bestow life on
what had persisted . . . to bring the estate into pulsing stelliferous Meaning,"
she effectively imposes Pierce's will upon herself (82). Further, if the Tristero should actually
be a creation of Pierce's, aimed at Oedipa, then ultimately all of her efforts
will only return her to herself. There is another possibility as well; Schaub
suggests that Oedipa may be at the heart (along with the Tristero) of her
declining society (36). As evidence he cites Oedipa's experience at her hotel
in Berkeley; in bed,
She fell asleep almost at once, but kept waking
from a nightmare about
something in the mirror, across from her bed.
Nothing specific, only a
possibility, nothing she could see. . . . When
she woke in the morning, she
was sitting bolt upright, staring into the mirror
at her own exhausted face.
(101)
This "possibility"
just may be that she is her own nightmare, that her identity and that of the
Tristero are somehow intimately linked. Of course, one need only recall her
status at the novel's opening as a Tupperware party attendee to find support
for the notion that Oedipa has been for some time responsible for the dispossession
of so many and the vapidity of her culture.[12]
At one point in her career as a private eye, Oedipa pursues
a W.A.S.T.E. courier with the intention of discovering the nature of this
underground communications system; the result, however, is that she is simply
led back to Nefastis' apartment (131). This comic, almost burlesque (though
Kafkaesque as well) outcome is characteristic of many of Oedipa's investigations;
given her more successful pursuit of the text of The Courier's Tragedy, Oedipa seems to make a much better literary
scholar than gumshoe detective.
Oedipa is first introduced to the play by the Paranoids,
who mention it upon overhearing Oedipa and Metzger's conversation about Pierce's
investment in human bones; they note that the play contains similar events.
She then hears the plot, "related near to unintelligible by eight memories
unlooping progressively into regions as strange to map as their rising coils
and clouds of pot smoke" (64).[13] These memories
are the product of eight readers reading; distorted, perhaps idiolectical,
they stand as evidence before Oedipa as to the factor that human memory and
perception play in the processing of texts. Frustrated by their incoherence,
however, Oedipa simply decides to see the play for herself; the lesson is
lost upon her.
She and Metzger attend a performance of The Courier's Tragedy, and her intention
is to discover the connection, if any, between the bones in the play and those
of Pierce's estate. Her experience, however, both foreshadows her perceptual
phase transition and pushes her closer to it, for the staged play itself dramatizes
this transformation. The first three acts contain nothing unusual; they conform
to the stereotype of the Jacobean revenge play. Well into the fourth act,
however, the very essence of communication undergoes a radical alteration.
Angelo, the Duke of Squamuglia, has just broken into a rage over the revelation
that the rightful heir to the duchy of Faggio remains alive; what follows
is worth quoting in full:
It is at about this point in the play, in fact,
that things really get peculiar,
and a gentle chill, an ambiguity, begins to
creep in among the words.
Heretofore the naming of names has gone on either
literally or as metaphor.
But now, as the Duke gives his fatal command,
a new mode of expression
takes over. It can only be called a kind of
ritual reluctance. Certain things,
it is made clear, will not be spoken aloud;
certain events will not be shown
onstage; though it is difficult to imagine,
given the excesses of the
preceding acts, what these things could possibly
be. The Duke does not,
perhaps may not, enlighten us. (71-72)
The passage is especially
difficult to explicate because it speaks of an ambiguity in equally ambiguous
terms.[14]
In this sense it describes itself, at least as concerns the reader's experience;
an ambiguity has quite literally entered the text at this point. Indeed, much
of the sense of the passage can easily be turned back to the body of Lot
49. The "naming of names" is obviously significant throughout
the novel, and some ("Mike Fallopian") are potentially metaphorical
while others, notably the historical ones, are literal. The "ritual reluctance"
describes perfectly the narrative's recurring cycle of approaching total revelation
and then pulling back from it. The fact that the Duke "may not"
have the capacity to explain this transformation provides for three readings.
The first is rather obvious: if the "new mode of expression" is
highly ambiguous, it naturally resists conventional modes of comprehension.
There is, however, an interesting analogue to the Duke: Pynchon himself. Read
this way, Pynchon's expression is the text of Lot
49; its polysemic nature and atotality means that even he cannot
possess the ability to disambiguate his own words. Finally, if "may not"
is read as "is not permitted to," the line resonates with the atmosphere
of conspiracy and paranoia that the novel establishes.
This odd communicative event occurs a second time in a Faggio
scene immediately following: "Again, as in Angelo's court, the curious
chill creeps in. Everyone onstage (having clearly been directed to do so)
becomes aware of a possibility" (72). This time, however, the surrounding
text suggests that a sudden collective awareness of the Tristero is responsible
for the transformation. If this is the cause of both radical shifts, then
the Tristero is directly linked to ambiguity; it becomes, in a sense, a point
of origin for ambiguity. Berressem points out that in both Lot 49 and the performance of The Courier's Tragedy the introduction of
a mystery marks the point at which the discourse begins to break down (96).
This mystery, this ambiguity, is the Tristero. Further, its name does not
seem to occupy any known linguistic category in human communication; it is
neither literal nor metaphoric, according to the first passage. This piece
of language, if it is even that, forges a powerful connection between Oedipa's
world and the reader's text; the Tristero disrupts both at precisely the same
moment, so that it becomes impossible for either Oedipa or the reader to continue
reading their texts as though they were instrumental. One might describe the
Tristero as antilanguage, as its effect is to shatter conventional linguistic
communication.
The play also contains another transformation, one that
is equally radical; in this case, the change occurs in a text within the play
itself. In the same act that the "ambiguity" of the Tristero disrupts
the exchange between the characters, a letter written by Angelo undergoes
an incredible conversion. Initially, it is "a pack of lies devised to
soothe Gennaro" until Angelo can invade; by the end of the act, the very
same letter has become "a long confession by Angelo of all his crimes"
(73, 74). This "miracle," as the play describes it, is "A life's
base lie, rewritten into truth" (74). It further explains that the transformation
is the result of the combination of the innocent Niccolò's blood and the charcoal
in the ink used to write the letter, which was made from the bones of murdered
soldiers.[15] In addition
to the confession, the letter now expresses the word "Tristero"
for the first time in the play, which is also the first time Oedipa encounters
it in the world of the novel. The connection between the Tristero and the
miraculous conversion of lies into truth is difficult to discern; both are
obviously radical distortions of communication, but the Tristero appears responsible
for Niccolò's death, to which the miracle is opposed. The fact that the miracle
reveals the name of the Tristero, something no other character is able to
do, further affirms this opposition. If the miracle is on the side of truth,
then the Tristero seems to be on the side of lies. Yet there is a danger in
holding to this dialectic too strongly; each transformation relies on the
other. Further, it may be foolish to do as Oedipa does and expect the Tristero,
whatever it is, to hold a consistent identity across the texts within the
novel; the only certainty one may have about the Tristero is that it is maximally
ambiguous.
Oedipa's experience in the theatre ultimately leads her
to the study of an actual "text" within the text of her world. The
obvious parallel between Oedipa's efforts to resolve the ambiguity of the
play and the reader's efforts to resolve the ambiguities of Lot 49 provides Pynchon with the opportunity
to comment directly on the reading process and the attention given to words
and texts. Following the performance of The Courier's Tragedy, Oedipa goes backstage to inquire after
the apparent connection between the bones in the play and those of Pierce's
estate. She is diverted from her purpose, however, into a discussion of the
script with the director, Randolph Driblette. From this dialogue Oedipa learns
that Driblette no longer has a copy of the original, though he does tell her
where she might find one. He simultaneously derides her for pursuing the text,
because, as he says, the play exists only in his mind: "That's what I'm
for. To give the spirit flesh. The words, who cares? They're rote noises to
hold line bashes with, to get past the bone barriers around an actor's memory,
right? But the reality is in this
head" (79). He also provides her with a solipsistic metaphor she later
applies to executing Pierce's will: he is the "projector at the planetarium."[16] He then suggests
that if he were to disappear, all that would be left are the things the play's
author "didn't lie about," such as the historical Thurn and Taxis
postal service (80).[17]
If Driblette is correct, and the play exists only in his
head, his character is in part a nod towards the idea that the communicative
act of performing a play or reading a novel is what matters, and the words
themselves are otherwise insignificant; conversely, the opposite may be true,
so that the words are plurisignificant
and therefore in need of performance, the making of connections, rather than
study. His closing dig seems aimed directly at critical analysis, which is
principally focussed on texts, not their performance; he says, "You can
put together clues, develop a thesis,
or several, about why characters reacted to the Trystero possibility the way
they did . . . You could waste your
life that way and never touch the truth" (emphasis added 80). It is rather
telling that later on Oedipa concludes that the atmosphere in which she grew
up, "a time of nerves, blandness, and retreat," made her "unfit
perhaps for marches and sit-ins, but just a whiz at pursuing strange words
in Jacobean texts" (103, 104). Both this comment and Driblette's appear
to emphasize the questionable nature of literary scholarship.
A contrasting viewpoint is provided by Professor Emory Bortz,
who naturally asserts the opposite; when Oedipa inquires after the "historical
Wharfinger," Bortz, accompanied by several graduate students, tells her
that he's dead. Bortz then instructs Oedipa to "Pick some words,"
because "Them, we can talk about" (151). His emphasis on words over
historical reality runs exactly counter to Driblette's privileging of the
communicative act; he does, however, comment positively on Driblette's performance
of the play. In fact, his impromptu eulogy reveals a powerful approach to
the interpretation of texts:
He was
a peculiarly moral man. He felt hardly any responsibility toward the
word, really; but to the invisible field surrounding the play, its spirit, he
was always intensely faithful. (emphasis added 152)
It is dangerous but tempting
to take this notion of an "invisible field" as characterizing Pynchon's
own beliefs concerning interpretation; yet it fits his text perfectly. Though
Lot 49 does not yield to totalizing
readings, and even limited close readings have a tendency to fall apart, the
novel as a whole seems to have its own continuity outside of the specific
language used in it. This continuity is perhaps indescribable; in part it
is probably idiolectical, composed as much of personal energy as textual;
yet it is sensibly there. One might say that this invisible field characterizes
all communication, for given the instability of language, something more must
enable people to understand one another.
Oedipa, however, chooses not to partake of this invisible
field; her affinities are with Bortz, as her research indicates. As Seed notes,
she longs for "textual stability" (123).[18]
When Driblette dies, however, she begins to wonder whether he might have been
right, and some part of her died with him; indeed, as she describes it, she
feels like an "amputee" (161). This is further evidence that the
novel as a whole favours a Driblettian field over the exacting pursuit of
the unstable word.
This conflict between the obsessive study of texts and communicative
activity is dramatized throughout the novel, and is arguably essential to
an understanding of its "conclusion." The end of the novel is typically
read as a commentary on excluded middles, the "bad shit" Oedipa
has heard she must avoid.[19] Ironically,
however, though Oedipa is aware of the danger of excluding middles, she does
exactly that and chains herself to the poles of a binary; either the Tristero is real, and she has
discovered the "truth," or
it is not real, and she is paranoid, crazy, or the victim of a plot. The reader
will probably also chain himself to these poles if he has been seduced by
Oedipa's detective-play; indeed, as Maureen Quilligan observes, the reader
is ultimately faced with the same binary (201). There is a certain desirability
in the binary, of course, because it enables Oedipa to deal with her world
in a very draconian fashion; she does not have to involve herself with the
real "sorting" of life, the process by which she would assume responsibility
for some things and accept that others are beyond her control. Similarly,
the reader is saved from sorting the variety of meanings within the text of
Lot 49 and taking responsibility
for his own conclusions by adopting an all-or-nothing approach.
The solution to Oedipa's binary is the same as that for
the reader's; both must accept the fact only some
of the meanings or communications they perceive are actually intended. When
Oedipa questions authorial intentionality she has the capacity to free herself,
but because she questions it in such a radical way she fails to see that limited
authorial intention is a possibility; she does not allow for the fact that
the Tristero may exist without all of the connections she perceives being
"real." She believes that the solution lies outside of herself,
that somehow the symmetry of choices will break down of its own accord (181).
The result is a failure to act, whether it is out of a belief that she cannot
act or that she need not act; the reader is led, in a similar fashion, to
wait for the text itself to provide a conclusion. Of course, the reader may
simply choose the "meaninglessness" half of the binary and, as Berressem
suggests, enjoy the free play of meaning; it is an option Oedipa does not
have because her text is her world, and the consequences of such a choice
would be devastating.
Oedipa does not need to withstand the terrible ambiguity
she faces, as Schaub has it, but must accept it as a part of human perception
(41). By accepting it she frees herself to act, to stop searching for the
single, unyielding "truth" in the text of her world (or of The Courier's Tragedy) and begin performing
within the text, as part of the text. Seduced by the binary, she fails to
really understand, even see, the text that does not conform to her Tristero
interpretation. Judith Chambers, however, believes that the old man Oedipa
succors in her walpurgisnacht
is a sign of her potential to transcend her binary; ". . . at some point
beyond the crying of lots she will understand that her search for the central
truth gets her nowhere but inside the parameters of whatever tapestry she
is weaving" (121). To be able to change her text, restore the disinherited,
she must accept the middle: there is no absolute, prefabricated structure
to her existence, nor is her world entirely of her own making; she must act,
and in acting, she can create new meaning. Early in the novel, it is suggested
that this is in fact the revelation she is to have: "As things developed,
she was to have all manner of revelations. Hardly about Pierce Inverarity,
or herself; but about what remained yet had somehow, before this, stayed away"
(20).
The reader must also resist the binary, and in this case
there are two significant reasons. If the reader plays the game with Oedipa
and reads the novel with the intention of resolving the Tristero, he is likely
to ignore or slight the vision of waste, loss, and human suffering that pervades
the book, especially in the later chapters; studying the text for clues obscures
the other very important meanings contained within it. Further, if the reader
accepts only the two apparent "options" provided by the text, he
will fail to act upon the text itself and make connections of his own; he
will fail to fully participate in the creation of meaning, leaving the responsibility
for that to the text and its author.
The ending suggests that to wait with Oedipa in the auction-house
is to fail to understand the infinitely deferred revelation characteristic
of the novel, as Berressem notes (114). Hite points out that this ending is
ultimately more imitative of life than the traditional narrative conclusion
many readers expect; for if life is structured like a narrative,
. . . it will reveal its significance only when it concludes, and this fact can
provide little comfort to characters who by
definition cannot get outside
the text of their experience. And if life does
not have such a narrative
form--if it does not build to a climatic insight--it
is meaningless. Or so it
seems, once 'order' becomes synonymous with
narrative order--or 'plot.'
(19)
Oedipa seems to subscribe
to the narrative approach, for she closes out the novel waiting for that "climactic
insight." The reader has a choice; he may abandon her at the auction
and create his own understanding of the novel, arrive at his own conclusions.
He may approach the world of the text as he approaches his own world, establishing
a personal order within the chaos of competing orders, acting to create meaning
rather than passively accepting a totalizing structure. For as Hite observes,
as long as proliferating meanings do not converge at a totality, "further
meanings are possible. The absence of a definitive synthetic unity is finally
a condition for freedom, and Pynchon plays on a further conclusion: such an
absence is also an enabling condition for language, and especially for the
language of his novels" (21). George Levine expresses this even more
forcefully, in a fashion that echoes several points of this study:
. . . we are driven by Pynchon's art into reconsidering
our fundamental assumptions about the way things
connect. The
discontinuities, the surprises, the refusals
of categories, the fake
mythologizing--these all confront us with the
possibility that art is most
valuable, in a culture where power resides among
the organizers, when it
rejects the tradition of organic coherence we
take as a universal standard. .
. . Might it be that not order but anarchy is
the most difficult thing to
achieve in this culture? The pressure toward
anarchy, in a world structured
to resist anarchy at any cost, might release
us, ironically, into a more
humane order . . . (117)
This, essentially, is what Pynchon's novel asks of its readers;
the challenge contained within the text as well as the challenge of reading
the text are a gesture towards change, whether it is the growth of the language
or the dismantling of false and dangerous totalities. It is not about the
pursuit of words, the search for truth in texts or interpretations, but about
the act of making meaning, of
interacting with the texts within and of our worlds.
[1]See also Hite, Levine, Tanner, Seed, and Schaub.
[2]This reading on Mucho's part may point to a principal failing of all of the characters in the novel: the inability to decide which text is to be read literally and which text signifies something more. In this case, perhaps Mucho should have realized that some signs are just "signs."
[3]Though it is probably not intended as an allusion, Hemingway's story "A Clean, Well-Lighted Place," similarly evokes the bleakness of life through a repetition of the word "nada," as well as its substitution into the Lord's Prayer.
[4]Berressem suggests that this "projection" may be of a Freudian nature, and directly connected to the paranoia Oedipa later fears she is victim to (97).
[5]It is unclear throughout most of the book which text belongs to the narrator and which to Oedipa.
[6]Schaub also claims that with the name "San Narciso," and its apparent allusion to the myth of Narcissus, "Pynchon engages the reader in the habit of reading messages in the medium of the book at the same time we are pursuing Oedipa in her search" (25).
[7]Seed also compares Oedipa's textual experiences with the reader's: "The novel as a whole imitates, [sic] the various information Oedipa receives by incorporating within itself important elements of ambiguity, uncertainty, and coincidence" (140).
[8]The perceptual phase transition, described in chapter two, marks the point at which a reader becomes aware of the potential polysemy lurking in all language. It is a heightened awareness of meaning.
[9]One realm of potential signification left untouched by critics is the (apparently) typographical error. In the edition of Lot 49 used for this study, for example, Oedipa's name is spelled "Odeipa" on page 103. This transposition allows for an interpretation tying the literary genre of the ode to Oedipa's quest, one which concludes that Oedipa and her quest are something of an encomium to the deceased Pierce and his estate. One might go so far as to suggest that San Narciso is the ironic inversion of the utopian land depicted in Ben Jonson's ode "To Penshurst." There is also an interesting connection, again probably unique to this edition, that one may make between Mr. Thoth's age (91) and the page upon which that information appears (91). As Thoth is the Egyptian god of scribes, the fact that his age and the page number are a match further establishes the textuality of Oedipa's world. While these two rather unusual readings of the text are questionable in terms of authorial intent, they nonetheless demonstrate the possibilities created by a highly polysemic text, especially when combined with a "sensitized" reader; and, of course, given Pynchon's knack for the bizarre, these readings are not altogether out of bounds.
[10]These two lines are unclear as to whether they indicate Oedipa's own insight or merely the narrator's greater knowledge or speculation; however, as they echo one another in such a short space, it is fair to claim that Oedipa must have some doubts.
[11]In the midst of the "nighttown" episode, Oedipa expresses an interesting notion: "At some indefinite passage in night's sonorous score, it came to her that she would be safe, that something, perhaps only her linearly fading drunkenness, would protect her" (emphasis added 117). The linear progression towards sobriety provides her, in a sense, with order in the midst of a polysemic, elliptical chaos; it is a kind of narrative structure.
[12]Also, given that Pierce's enterprises are throughout the novel associated with the repressive and controlling aspects of industry and mass culture, Oedipa is indeed a criminal of another sort for assisting in their continuation by executing the will. She is partially redeemed at the novel's end, when she considers "spreading some kind of legacy" from the estate among "all those nameless" (181).
[13]The notion that the regions into which their memories "unloop" are as "strange to map as their rising coils and clouds of pot smoke" is an interesting one in light of Pynchon's background; mathematically speaking, the "mapping" or description of diffuse coils and clouds has only recently been made possible by the development of fractal geometry. Prior to this, only traditional geometric shapes were considered worth study. It is a probable allusion.
[14]Schaub calls particular attention to this passage as well by subtitling his chapter on Lot 49 "A Gentle Chill, an Ambiguity." The fact that the entrance of ambiguity is marked by a chill accords with the inhuman nature of maximally polysemic language. At the least, it suggests that ambiguity is regarded negatively.
[15]There is an interesting historical connection between writing and alchemy; it would not be surprising if Pynchon alludes to it here.
[16]It is ironic that Oedipa should take to such a metaphor when she responds with tears at the Remedios Varo painting, whose meaning is nearly the same.
[17]In light of the history mixed into the text of Lot 49, one may usefully apply this notion to Pynchon's novel; if he had not produced his book, Thurn and Taxis would remain historical realities but their narrative presence would cease to be.
[18]As such, Oedipa is in good company with a host of misguided Joyceans and perhaps the whole of every Medieval Studies department in the world.
[19]Although context favors a reading that suggests Oedipa is aware of the dangers of binary thinking, as most critics believe, the ambiguity of the lines allows for another reading; perhaps Oedipa does not believe that one should avoid excluding middles, but that already excluded middles are to be avoided, and that binary logic has eliminated something potentially dangerous.